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Abstract: 
Deliberation often begins with the question "What do I want to do?" 
rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that 
question at face value, as a question about which of one's desires is 
strongest, which sometimes guides action.  The paper aims to explain 
which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of 
"strength" relevant to this deliberative question. 
 The paper argues that one's judgment about one wants most will 
sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent 
most wants, and so making itself true. 
 
Keywords: Desires, Practical Reason, Practical Rationality, Self-Knowledge, 
Humean Theory of Reasons 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Verdictive Organization of Desire 
 
2 
 
I sometimes find myself in a bind: I don’t know what I want to do. In the two years 
following college I didn’t know what I wanted to do with my life. This produced a decent 
amount of anxiety. Less melodramatically, I sometimes find myself at the record store, 
CD in hand, wondering whether I want to buy it. Coming to a conclusion can take several 
minutes. And, in general, while my deliberation about what to do next often begins with 
the question, “What should I do now?” it just as frequently begins “What do I want to do 
now?” Answering the second question can be as difficult as answering the first. 
 Of course, “Do I want this CD?” is elliptical. I must have some desire for it. I 
have the CD in hand; I’m thinking about buying it. The deliberative bind arises because I 
also want to keep my money. So we should read the question “Do I want this CD?” as 
shorthand for “Do I want this CD enough?” or “Do I want this CD more than I want to 
keep my fifteen dollars?” 
 But what am I trying to figure out when I ask myself if I want the CD more? 
There are several reasons to want a philosophical account of what it is to want one thing 
more than another. Most ambitiously, such an account will be of great value to standard 
Humean theories of reasons. Sometimes desires conflict, and so Humeanism will ascribe 
conflicting reasons to the agent in question. The theory, then, must also assign relative 
weights to these conflicting reasons. It is natural to think that in these cases, the rational 
agent will act on her strongest desire, and that the relative weights of reasons will 
corresponds to the relative strengths of the desires providing them.1 But then we need an 
account of strength. 
More modestly, it seems that we try to figure out what we want the most, because 
sometimes that will be the most reasonable thing for us to do. There are many worthwhile 
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careers I could pursue, and there are many aesthetically valuable pieces of music I could 
listen to (Chang 1998). Plausibly, when faced with these situations, I should choose that 
career which I most want of the acceptable options, and I should listen to the music I 
most want to hear. But then what is this aspect of a desire that makes its object the object 
I most want? What is it for one desire to be stronger than another? 
One might object that it is enjoyment or happiness rather than wanting that 
provides me with reason to listen to music (Chang 2004). This answer is also plausible. 
But fully assessing the relative merits of “do what you want” compared to “do what you 
would enjoy” requires a better understanding of what wanting is and what enjoyment is. 
So for the purposes of this paper I will assume that one of the following is true. Either 
enjoyment is something that results from the satisfaction of a desire, and hence deserves 
to be identified as part of a desire’s phenomenological intensity, something which on my 
account is a component of a desire’s strength; or else one’s desires are independent of 
feelings of pleasure or enjoyment, except to the extent that these are the objects of one’s 
desires.  
I will also assume that desires are not identical to evaluative beliefs, and that their 
strength can vary independently of the degree to which the agent believes their objects as 
valuable.2 As Harry Frankfurt (1987) points out, caring about one’s own children more 
than other people’s children does not depend on the belief that one’s own children are 
more valuable than other children. I care about philosophy considerably more than 
painting, sculpture, physics, or macroeconomics, but not because I believe philosophy to 
be an intrinsically more worthwhile pursuit. I just find that I care about it more.3 
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For these reasons, the paper will take the question, “What do I want to do?” at 
face value, as a question about one’s psychology, which we ask in deliberation. 
“Strength” and “wanting more” in the sense at interest in this paper are non-normative 
properties of an agent’s psychological states that explain certain normative facts, such as 
the weight of the reason provided by a desire, or which action would be most rational for 
an agent to perform. 
 In the next section I will introduce what I take to be the most natural account of 
what it is for one desire to be stronger than another: for that desire to motivate action 
more strongly than the other, and for the associated phenomenology to be more intense. I 
will argue (section 2) that this natural picture leads, however, to massive indeterminacy 
in the strength of one’s desires, to a degree that would render them unfit for rationalizing 
an agent’s choice or settling what to do. I then argue (section 3) that this indeterminacy is 
mitigated because the agent’s answer to her deliberative question, her judgment about 
what she wants most, can play a role in establishing, definitively, what it is she wants the 
most.  
The paper, then (in section 4) will argue for an instance of the familiar, if highly 
contentious, claim that a person’s self-understanding has a self-fulfilling aspect, a claim 
advocated most notably by David Velleman (2000; 2006; and 2008). The version offered 
here, however, is not based on any of the explanatory assumptions used by Velleman; 
rather it will turn out to follow from very widely accepted platitudes about desires and 
intentional action explanation, platitudes to which many are already committed. So the 
paper will show that we always should have expected self-conceptions to have a self-
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fulfilling aspect, that this was already implicit in a standard understanding of the belief-
desire model. 
 
2. The Indeterminacy of Desire 
 
Here is the most natural thing to think about the strength of desire: one intrinsic desire is 
stronger than another if it motivates more strongly than the other, and if it has a more 
intense phenomenology or felt aspect. 4  Motivational strength can be characterized 
dispositionally: in the simplest case, in which it is directly within the power of the agent 
to bring about the desired ends, the agent desires p more than q just in case she is 
disposed to choose p rather than q when she believes those to be her alternatives. In more 
complex cases, in which the ends are not immediately attainable, the desire’s 
motivational strength will be modulated by how likely the agent believes her option will 
bring about the desired end. Phenomenological intensity is harder to define, but I assume 
readers are familiar. 
This is primarily a story of the strength of intrinsic desires. While the strength of 
an instrumental desire can perhaps come apart from the strength of the intrinsic desires on 
which it is based, when the agent is instrumentally irrational, from the point of view of an 
agent asking the deliberative question “What do I want most?” the strength of an 
instrumental desire will be in general a function of the strengths of the agent’s intrinsic 
desires. It will be determined by how much the instrumentally-desired object contributes 
to the satisfaction and frustration of the agent’s intrinsic desires, weighted by how strong 
each intrinsic desire is, and by how probable satisfying the instrumental desire makes 
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their satisfaction and frustration. (Cases in which, from the deliberator’s point of view, 
the strength of an instrumental desire is independent of the strength of the intrinsic 
desires on which it is based will be discussed in section three.) 
The first problem with this account is that motivational strength and 
phenomenological intensity can come apart. Humberstone (1990) points out that we can 
characterize at least one form of laziness this way: when the force with which a desire 
motivates is significantly weaker than the desire’s felt intensity. In the other direction, 
one may find oneself, especially while tired, strongly motivated to repeatedly check one’s 
email even though it seems to do nothing to bring satisfaction or alleviate frustration.5 So 
when motivation and phenomenology come apart, which desire is strongest? 
One response is to put all the weight on the phenomenology. There are of course 
senses of “wanting more” and “strength of desire” that refer to the desire’s motivational 
properties. But the sense relevant to the deliberative question ‘What do I want to do 
most?’ refers to the phenomenological properties of the desire. My strongest desire, in the 
sense relevant to the deliberative question, is the desire with the most intense 
phenomenology, or so the answer would go. 
 But if we look at a wider range of cases, this position seems implausible. Consider 
an agent who is lazy in Humberstone’s sense: she would be very happy if she discovered 
that her office was cleaned up, but has no motivation at all to clean it. Now imagine 
another agent who would be equally happy to have a clean office, but she is actually 
motivated to clean it. I am perfectly willing to grant that the first agent wants a clean 
office, perhaps even strongly desires it; but it seems obvious that the second agent wants 
a clean office even more. We might put the point this way, the first agent would like a 
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clean room, but she doesn’t care about it as much as the second. In general, if one feels 
strongly about certain possibilities but is unwilling to take steps to realize them, one’s 
concern seems more superficial than one with the same feelings who is also motivated to 
act. 
Let’s return to the agent who would be very happy to discover that she had a clean 
office but isn’t motivated to clean it. Let’s add that she has a second desire for a cup of 
coffee. We can stipulate that while she gets only a tiny amount of satisfaction from 
drinking another cup of coffee (she is already good and caffeinated), she is actually 
motivated to go get it; she even braves the rain. What does she want more—to have a 
clean room or drink a cup of coffee? I lack clear intuitions on the matter. 
 There are two lessons we can draw. First, motivational force contributes 
something to a desire’s overall strength. Second, how much it contributes relative to 
phenomenology is unclear. This is my first point in favor of indeterminacy in the relative 
strengths of our desires. If strength is to have precise values, phenomenological intensity 
and motivational force must add up on a common scale, but there seems not to be such a 
scale. 
 Even if one finds this argument unconvincing, because one believes that the 
phenomenology (or the motivational force) should bear all the normative weight, the case 
for widespread indeterminacy remains strong. Motivational force can change with 
differences in the environment, sometimes quite trivial ones like the presence of 
advertisements (that’s why advertisements work). And motivation is unstable not just 
across situations, but over time. I can be strongly disposed to say something unkind for a 
moment or two, but once that time has passed be strongly disposed to avoid saying 
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unkind things. This sort of instability is clearly relevant to what I want most in the 
deliberative sense. If I am more motivated to buy the CD now, because of 
advertisements, but will be more motivated to try to return it later when the 
advertisements are gone, that counts against my strongly wanting the CD in the sense 
relevant to the deliberative question, all else being equal.6 
The phenomenology of our desires is, if anything, even less stable; they vary with 
mood, attention, vividness, and our distance from their fulfillment or frustration (cf. 
Bykvist 2009). 7  What’s more, our feelings of satisfaction and frustration come in 
different “flavors”—the satisfaction of a particular desire might take the forms of 
happiness, relief, sensual pleasure, the cool sense of achieving intellectual clarity, and so 
on; frustration can come as sadness, pain, irritation, anger, despair, and so on. Comparing 
these different flavors on any scale of intensity is hard. As Krister Bykvist (2009, 26-27) 
notes in a different context, we have no idea what it would mean to be as proud that p as 
one was pleased that q. Consider: “I am as proud of running the marathon as I am pleased 
by the chance to watch TV.” Or imagine the mild excitement one would get from 
speeding on the highway. Then imagine what it would feel like to be slightly lonelier than 
that. Perhaps what can be compared in at least some cases is the degree of pleasure 
produced by satisfying the desire. But pleasures seem to come in different “flavors” as 
well. Compare the pleasure that comes from finally seeing the solution to a difficult 
intellectual problem with the pleasure one gets from drinking a cold beverage on a hot 
day, or either to the pleasure that comes from listening to a Tom Waits song.8 Each of 
these pleasures feels different, and consequently it is hard to compare them with any 
precision. 
Verdictive Organization of Desire 
 
9 
 
The last point should be emphasized: what is difficult is comparing the intensity 
of different kinds of feelings with precision. Compare the pride one might take in 
completing a marathon for the first time with the the very mild pleasure one would derive 
from watching a mediocre sitcom. It seems that one could know that the former clearly 
outweighs the latter in its intensity. The claim that sounded strange was one that asserted 
the intensities of the two feelings were equal: ‘I am as proud of running the marathon as I 
am pleased by the chance to watch TV’. Similarly, it is hard to imagine what it is like to 
be just slightly lonelier than mildly excited. I take this to be evidence that the intensity of 
phenomenology does not come in precise degrees. Comparisons, then, are possible 
between different kinds of experience when the difference in intensity is large. But when 
two experiences (pride and being pleased, say) are close in intensity, there is often no fact 
of the matter which is most intense (or if there is equality). This amounts to another 
source of indeterminacy in how phenomenologically intense our desires are. 
What’s more, phenomenology does not simply arise upon desire’s satisfaction or 
disappointment. There is prospective phenomenology as well, which also comes in 
different flavors. 
Again, this isn’t to deny that we have a rough idea of which desires are more 
intense when the flavors differ—in fact, it is necessary for my account that we do. But we 
have good grounds for thinking phenomenological intensity imprecise; and so it will 
often be indeterminate which of a set of desires has the most intense satisfactions and 
frustrations. 
A final source of indeterminacy may come from a distinction between those wants 
that should be categorized as values and those that are mere desires. An agent may be 
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more strongly motivated to continue smoking than to quit, and the craving for another 
cigarette may come with much more intense feelings than the desire for health. 
Nonetheless, there may be reasons to think she values her health more than she values 
smoking. Is the fact that she values health more reason to think that she wants health 
more?9 
For my purposes I can plead neutrality: whether valuing is a state distinct from 
being motivated or disposed to have certain experiences, and whether that distinct state 
contributes to how much one wants something, will depend on larger claims about moral 
psychology—on one’s particular theory about what valuing is. However, if valuing does 
contribute to how much one wants a given end, this simply introduces further grounds for 
indeterminacy in the relative strength of desires. Not only must we compare motivational 
facts with phenomenological facts, but these must be compared with facts about valuing 
as well. 
To summarize, the obvious view is that the strength of a desire is determined by 
its motivational and phenomenological properties (and possibly by more complex states 
as well, such valuing the relevant end). But motivation and phenomenology are complex 
phenomena, and each complexity seems potentially relevant. We have motivational force 
and its variation across situations and over time. We have the range of emotional 
responses which satisfaction or frustration (and their anticipation) might bring, both 
across situations and times. Each of these differences can give reason to call a desire 
stronger or weaker. But how important is each element relative to others? How can we 
construct a scale on which all of these elements add up? 
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Occasional indeterminacy would likely be theoretically unproblematic (however 
undesirable for the agent who finds herself in such a situation). But the preceding 
argument suggests that it is potentially widespread. Indeterminacy is virtually guaranteed 
to occur in any of the larger dilemmas in which the question of what one wants arises—
such as “What do I want to do with my life?” or “Do I want children?” (The flavors 
differ; towards these questions my feelings and inclinations vacillate; if I am honest I 
know that my motivation and enthusiasm for carrying out the decision will vary over time 
and context.) Indeterminacy is also likely to arise in those smaller conflicts where 
personal pleasures are at issue, such as “Do I want to listen to music or go on a hike?” 
Perhaps we should accept this. But the case against settling on such widespread 
indeterminacy is straightforward: it is precisely when confronting problems like the 
career to pursue or whether to have children that people begin deliberation with the 
question “What do I want?” It would be strange to discover that we are inclined to ask 
ourselves, and treat as normatively relevant, a question that could have no answer in 
exactly those situations most likely to inspire us to ask. 
 
3. Verdictive Self-Reflection and the Legal Analogy10 
 
I will argue here that the agent’s own judgment about what she most wants to do will 
often mitigate indeterminacy. The judgment can do this, because, I will argue, there is 
reason to think that such judgments can function as verdictives—that is, as reports on 
some matter of fact, which at least sometimes succeed in making it the case that that very 
fact reported obtains (Austin 1962). Some care is needed here: a verdictive is a type of 
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speech act—the classic example being the referee’s judgment that one team has scored a 
point against another, a judgment which makes it the case that the team has one more 
point than previously. The care is needed because I do not wish to argue that self-
reflective judgments are a speech act; they are instead a form of belief. What’s more, 
verdictives are identified as a type of action; hence there is a question whether one must 
intend for one’s speech act to be a verdictive if one is genuinely to issue one, or whether 
the speech act can be performed unintentionally. This leads us to a question of whether 
speech acts should be categorized on the basis of communicative intention or 
communicative effect, a problem that would take us far off course in this paper. 11 
Fortunately, we can put it to one side and say that, however we choose to categorize 
them, there is a class of speech acts that will have a verdictive function even if the 
speaker intends only to issue a garden-variety report. The explanation of how these 
reports could come to possess a verdictive function, regardless of speaker intention, will 
shed light on how a belief could come to have a self-fulfilling aspect, without positing 
any desire, drive, or intention to vindicate the belief.12 
I will use HLA Hart’s (1962) discussion of the law’s open texture and the role 
that judicial verdicts play with respect to it as an example that sheds the most light on 
how self-reflective judgments could function as verdictives. For Hart, the correct 
interpretation of the written law is often indeterminate (124-136). No law could specify 
its correct application in every possible scenario, and so there will inevitably be cases in 
which a range of reasonable interpretations exists. How bad must driving be, before it 
counts as reckless? Does a ban on vehicles in the park apply to skateboards? Does it 
apply to strollers? (126). So, “at the margin of rules… the courts perform a rule-
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producing function…” (135). In normal cases, their verdicts simply report on what the 
law mandates. But in cases where the law itself is indeterminate, the judge’s verdict is 
partially determinative of the facts about the law.13 
 Whether or not this is correct about the law, it’s what Hart should say, given his 
commitment to legal positivism. For Hart, legal facts are a species of social fact—facts 
about what is enforced by state authorities, what is deferred to as authoritative by the 
population, and so on. If a set of prescriptions count as law in a given society, it is 
because they guide actual behavior; they play an explanatory role in the society. We 
should expect, then, that judicial verdicts would sometimes be determinative of the law: 
they are themselves objects of social reality, and so potentially part of the law’s grounds 
or basis of reduction. 
 The judicial verdict is a description of a legal prescription, made by a figure 
others take to be authoritative. This ruling on what the law says will thus determine the 
behavior of legal officials. Bailiffs, police, and prosecutors will use it as a guide in 
enforcement; judges will cite it as precedent in their own rulings; other lawyers will cite 
it in their arguments and in their advice to clients. In other words, the verdict plays the 
causal-explanatory role of law: it supports the right complex of dispositions in the 
society. The legal fact exists in virtue of facts about people’s behavior; the judge’s 
verdict changes people’s beliefs about the law, causing their behavior to change. So the 
fact the verdict describes will sometimes be explained by the verdict itself. 
Admittedly, judges may sometimes come to the conclusion that the law is 
indeterminate, and so decide to consciously exercise their rule-producing power—that is, 
they may intend to issue a verdict that is also a verdictive. Likewise, the relevant legal 
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authorities may believe a particular verdict to have produced a new rule. In these cases 
the verdict will seem much more analogous to a decision or stipulation than a report or 
belief. But the important point is that the verdict can be intended and understood simply 
as a report on the law, and still serve a rule-producing function. Given the structure laid 
out above, all that is required is that people change their behavior to conform with the 
ruling, and they may well do that because they take it to be an accurate report on the 
content of the law (which it is, thanks to their compliance). And what’s more, there are 
obvious reasons why judicial verdicts may sometimes play their verdictive role more 
effectively if the parties involved understand them as responses to evidence which 
attempt to get things right. 
Returning to the theory offered here, it is a commonplace that belief-desire 
psychology is both normative and explanatory.14 At the very least, strength of desire has 
been assumed to be a property with both explanatory and normative roles: one desire is 
stronger than another in virtue of a certain counterfactual profile; but at the same time, 
judgments about the strength of one’s desires are, or at least often function as, implicit 
judgments about what one has most reason to do, or which action one’s attitudes would 
best rationalize. This judgment will, in successful cases, regulate self-conscious 
deliberation, choice, and the exercise of will; in other words, it will instantiate the sorts of 
psychological dispositions to which the property of strength reduces or which ground it. 
The agent asks herself “What do I want to do?” This question involves reflection 
on her psychology. Sometimes, it is already decided by the facts in place. Even if the 
degrees of strength are fuzzy, only a limited number of desires will be at stake in a given 
choice situation, and of those, one may be simply stronger than all competitors. “How 
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much stronger?” may have no answer of course—but in a simple decision problem, 
where I can immediately effect the relevant end, I don’t need to answer that to resolve 
deliberation. Even if uncertainty is an issue, I will need some idea of how much stronger 
one desire is than another, but how precise this needs to be will vary with the decision 
problem I face.15 And again, in many cases, one desire is simply strong enough, relative 
to competitors and the likelihood of the various outcomes that could follow from taking 
each option, that one of these options is determinately superior. One makes a judgment, 
then, about which desire is stronger on the basis of one’s evidence—the evidence being 
one’s evidence about the desires’ motivational and phenomenological profiles. On the 
basis of that judgment one will conclude one’s deliberation, ending, assuming there is no 
weakness of will, in a choice. If the judgment is accurate the choice will be reasonable 
(assuming it was already reasonable to pursue what one wanted the most); otherwise it 
will be unreasonable. 
Sometimes, however, there is no prior fact of the matter. But even if there is no 
prior fact of the matter, the evidence available to the agent can seem (at least to that 
agent) to favor a conclusion. This will lead her to a belief about what it is she most wants, 
and that belief will often function like a verdictive: the belief that she wants one option 
more than another will make it the case. 
After all, if I believe myself to want something, this allows me to consciously 
decide to pursue the object, or consciously plan to achieve the goal. A desire or goal that 
I don’t realize I have is not one that can figure in conscious deliberation. If I believe I 
desire some goal more than its rival, then in conscious decision-making I will, in ordinary 
cases, plan to bring the goal about even at the expense of the rival. And it will make more 
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sense to me to exercise willpower (that is, consciously direct attention, or exhort myself) 
on behalf of the desire when it conflicts with its rival. These various aspects of conscious 
deliberation will then influence my behavior, making my behavior more likely to 
conform to the belief. 
In short, a judgment about a desire’s strength is an implicit judgment about the 
desire’s normative significance, and so will tend to play a role in directing choice (that 
tendency, of course, moderated by tendencies to akrasia, to abandoning conscious plans 
and decisions, and other familiar defects of practical rationality). Because of her belief 
about the desire’s strength, the agent will tend to have dispositions to act; and these are 
the dispositions that (partially) determine the strength of a desire. Notice that, just as a 
judicial verdict can play a verdictive role without the judge intending to issue a verdictive 
but simply to report on the law’s content, the relevant belief can determine the strength of 
a desire while being a belief—an attitude that represents how things are rather than how 
they are to be. 
This last point is important, because the argument that our beliefs about our 
desires sometimes alter their strength is not meant to follow from introspective evidence. 
I fully admit that when I inquire into what it is I want, it feels to me like I am discovering, 
not creating, something about myself. But this is what the verdictive model predicts. Just 
as a judicial verdict can play its verdictive role without seeming to participants in the 
legal system like a decision to change the law, so a self-reflective belief can play a 
verdictive role in my psychology, even while it seems to me to simply be a report on an 
independently existing reality. Insofar as their familiar evidence favoring the verdictive 
account, it is simply the fact that I can better and more consistently pursue my desires 
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when I know that I have them (which, if a desire is a state with a functional role of 
disposing an agent to pursue its satisfaction, means that knowing what I want tends to 
improve the ability of my want to play its functional role).  
But the central argument for the verdictive model is simply that it follows 
naturally from standard theoretical commitments. Like the law on Hart’s positivist 
conception, an agent’s attitudinal psychology has normative and explanatory dimensions: 
desires both causally explain further instrumental motives and actions, and rationalize 
them. The judgment that one has a desire of a certain strength therefore is an implicit 
judgment about which motivational dispositions it would be rational for one to possess—
namely, the very same motives which would be explained by a desire of the strength one 
believes oneself to have. The agent making the judgment, as a rational agent, will thus 
have a general disposition to acquire those instrumental motives, making her psychology 
more closely resemble the one she takes herself to have. 
One worry with this account might be that it allows beliefs to alter an agent’s 
intrinsic desires (or at least how strong those desires are). But how can a belief do that? 
The answer is similar to Michael Smith’s account of the practicality (or motivating role) 
of moral beliefs (2004, “Defence,” 273-274). Self-reflective beliefs about one’s desires 
are implicit judgments about which instrumental desires or intentions it would be 
rationally coherent to possess. Failure to possess attitudes one believes that it would be 
more rationally coherent for one to possess is a way of being at odds with oneself, and 
hence is a failure of rational coherence. What’s more, rational agents possess a general 
disposition to update their attitudes in the direction of greater rationality (ibid). Given 
this, and the fact that a belief about the strength of a desire is an implicit judgment on 
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which instrumental motives it is rational to have, the agent’s general disposition to 
greater rationality will tend to result in the belief playing a verdictive role.16  
 Note that the verdictive role of self-reflective beliefs is explained by a general 
psychological tendency towards greater rational coherence. However, because we are 
imperfectly rational, there will be cases in which this tendency fails to manifest. In these 
cases, self-reflective judgments will fail to play their verdictive role. (Thanks to imperfect 
rationality any attitude-type can fail on some occasions to play some of their functional 
roles.) The theory also leaves open the possibility of more complex cases—in which the 
belief results in a general motivational disposition, but fails to motivate on this occasion. 
These will be cases in which the belief plays its verdictive role, although on this occasion 
the agent displays weak will. (Whether the agent has a desire of the relevant strength 
depends on what she is disposed to do—and what she does on this occasion may be 
excellent evidence about her dispositions, but it does not determine the matter.) 
There are several additional aspects of the verdictive account that deserve 
clarification. First, is the belief a partial determinant of the desire’s strength in a 
constitutive or a causal sense?17 The basic verdictive model is compatible with either 
answer. My preferred answer is that it is constitutive in the ideal case, though it may be 
causal in cases that depart from the ideal. In the legal case, the judicial verdict will often 
be a constituent of the legal fact it makes true. Given the surrounding legal infrastructure 
(systems of disseminating the ruling, state officials, lawyers, dispositions of deference 
among the public) the ruling will itself instantiate the relevant dispositional facts—such 
as being disposed to cause judges to rule in certain ways on certain cases—that make it 
true that the law prescribes as the verdict says it does. Similarly, given the agent’s 
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background rationality, the belief about the strength of one’s desires will realize the 
relevant functional properties. It is only in less ideal cases, in which the agent’s 
background rationality initially fails, that the determination will be causal. These will be 
cases in which the judgments are initially false, but still do enough work guiding one’s 
action, deliberation, imagining, and self-declarations that they start to shift one’s conative 
profile in the direction of their truth. 
In cases where the relation is causal, the judgment will initially be false, though it 
will become true more or less quickly. More generally, it should be obvious that the 
model does not in any way entail infallibility about the strength of one’s desires. The 
judgments exercise a verdictive function because of their implicit normative import—but 
normative import sometime fails to move us. 
Nor does the model imply that we are always rationally obliged to act on our 
acknowledged desires. Of course I can acknowledge myself to have a desire but reject 
acting on it, and nothing about the verdictive model says otherwise. Humeans who accept 
the model can still say this rejection is rationalized by an even stronger acknowledged 
desire, while for those who reject Humeanism it may be rationalized by something else—
most likely one’s normative beliefs. 
It is also worth noting that nothing in the model suggests that self-reflective 
verdicts fully eliminate indeterminacy. In fact, there is good reason to suspect they could 
not. Unless I am extraordinarily self-controlled and mindful there will still be possible 
circumstances in which I would act contrary to my verdict; and the phenomenology 
associated with two rival desires may remain unaffected by that verdict as well.18 But the 
motivations of the theory are compatible with some indeterminacy even after the verdict 
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is reached. All that is needed to resolve the deliberation question is that the verdicts 
mitigate indeterminacy, so that the agent definitively prefers one of her options: the claim 
here is that often it enough to determine such a preference that the verdict would lead the 
agent to systematically choose pursuit of X instead of Y in a wide range of options. 
Another question is whether the verdictive account here applies only to intrinsic 
desires, or to instrumental desires as well?19 The explanatory story told here suggests that 
it should work with both. The story, remember, is that the belief that I have a desire with 
a certain strength puts rational pressure on me to act in a manner consistent with a desire 
of that strength. Given that instrumental desires can rationalize further instrumental aims, 
a judgment that I desire some means (money, say) to a certain degree should put rational 
pressure on me to make choices (investing more, working extra hours) consistent with 
that instrumental desire.  
Now in many cases I do not need to come to an independent assessment of how 
much I want an instrumental good, because the strength of my instrumental desire simply 
follows from how much I want the ends that they promote, especially from the point of 
view of deliberation. If I judge that what I want to do most now is go on a hike, this will 
put rational pressure on me to form an instrumental desire to put on my shoes, which will 
rationalize a further desire to walk to where my shoes are. Forming an independent 
judgment about how much I want to put my shoes on would be unnecessary. But in some 
cases an independent belief about how much I desire some means may serve the purpose 
of bringing consistency to my deliberation.  
Consider again the desire for money. Money is instrumental to a number of things 
I desire intrinsically—security, health, happiness, the happiness of my children, their 
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education, and so on. Actually enumerating all of the ends served by having more money, 
coming to assessments of my relative strength of concern for each of these ends, and then 
assessing how likely it is that a given increase in my net worth will allow me to achieve 
these ends might be too complex a problem for me to solve. Coming to an independent 
judgment of how strongly I desire a certain amount of money may allow me to resolve 
dilemmas such as whether to buy a new CD by simplifying them. Then I don’t need to 
come to a judgment about how much I want each of the possible things on which I could 
spend that fifteen dollars, let alone the uses to which I could put it after allowing it to sit 
in an investment account for twenty years. 
Admittedly, this could lead to instrumental desires that are inconsistent in strength 
with the intrinsic desires on which they are based. But this is just to note that agents will 
not always be perfectly instrumentally rational, something which is true of actual human 
agents anyway. It is not unique to the verdictive account. 
While other advantages of the verdictive model will become apparent in the 
following section, the most obvious is this: it allows us to reconcile the commonsense 
picture of strength of desire, in which the desire’s strength is determined by its 
dispositional profile, including both dispositions to act and dispositions to experience 
feelings of certain intensities, with the fact that we often frame deliberation in terms of 
what we most want, and are able to resolve deliberation so framed. 
 
4. Alternatives and Objections 
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This section addresses alternative accounts of how agents sort and organize their desires 
and considers objections to the verdictive account. 
 
4.1. Comparison with Velleman’s Theory 
 
Because of obvious similarities, it is worth contrasting the account here with David 
Velleman’s well-known theory. (A full critique of Velleman’s account is beyond the 
scope of this paper; the comparison is presented here for clarification.) Velleman also 
argues that self-reflective beliefs can make themselves true, or determine the facts about 
their objects, again largely by the way such beliefs will influence subsequent choice. For 
Velleman the explanatory mechanism is different, however. In the earlier (2000) work it 
is a desire for self-understanding; in the latter, it is a sub-personal drive to know the truth. 
In either version, this desire or drive will be satisfied if the agent’s behavior conforms to 
her predictions about what she will do. This provides significant motivation to bring her 
behavior in line with her predictions—which consequently function as self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Intentions, for Velleman, just are beliefs that function as self-fulfilling 
prophecies. 20  Ideal agency is consequently a matter of forming a relatively 
comprehensive and detailed self-conception which the agent is motivated to comply with 
in order to have a more accurate picture of the world. 
The verdictive judgments proposed here are not predictions at all (though various 
predictions will feed into them as evidence). When I judge that one desire is stronger than 
another, I am not implicitly predicting that I will actually act on that desire in the next 
relevant situation. I must believe that I would act on the desire in some host of more 
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favorable circumstances, but that is compatible with the belief that current circumstances 
are unfavorable, that, for example, I will give in to temptation. The judgment is an 
implicit commitment about which action would be most rational for me. But this is to say 
that it directs my behavior because there is an implicitly normative component to the 
judgment, which determines choice in the standard way that normative assessments direct 
our deliberation—not by serving as a self-fulfilling prophecy, and not because I have any 
desire or drive to achieve an accurate picture of the world. 
Velleman’s view has been developed over the course of over two decades, and it 
would be beyond the scope of this paper to offer a decisive argument against it here. 
Nonetheless, several reasons can be given here to hope the verdictive account will 
ultimately be more promising. 21  Most important is the weakness of the theoretical 
commitments needed for the account. Velleman must posit a motivation, universally at 
work in normal adult human beings, to understand oneself. The model here depends only 
on the standard platitude that desires play both an explanatory and a rationalizing role. A 
fundamental drive for knowledge is thus unnecessary, because the idea that self-
conceptions would have a self-fulfilling aspect was always implicit all along in the 
commitments of the standard belief-desire model. 
The verdictive model, moreover, avoids commitment to the very contentious 
thesis that intentions are actually a species of belief. The simplest case against this thesis 
is that it seems possible to intend some action without believing that one will perform the 
action; one can intend but be unsure one will follow through (Holton 2009; and Ross 
2009). 
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One can object to Velleman’s theory that the formation of self-fulfilling 
predictions must be epistemically irrational (Langton 2004). Imagine that one is trying to 
determine whether it will rain tomorrow or not. You are informed, by God, that it will 
rain tomorrow if you believe it will and won’t if you believe it won’t. On what basis 
could you possibly reach one conclusion or another? Similarly, once someone comes to 
know the truth of Velleman’s theory, how does she continue to form intentions?  
It may seem that the verdictive account is equally vulnerable to this objection. 
After all, once someone knows his desire is likely to be indeterminate, how can he 
continue to conclude there is something he most wants? But the verdictive model can 
offer a straightforward answer: by believing irrationally, something eminently possible 
for us. 
Theoretical and practical reason may sometimes make incompatible demands. 
The evil demon may torture me if I fail to believe an additional unsupported falsehood; it 
may be easier to jump across the gorge if I believe I will be successful at jumping across 
the gorge. The objection points out that the verdictive theory generates similar conflicts. 
Agents in a certain evidential situation cannot engage a standard capacity for achieving 
greater practical rationality without committing epistemic irrationality. The verdictive 
account can simply allow that this is true and deny it is a significant objection.22 In these 
scenarios some will remain epistemically rational, and so unable to resolve the 
indeterminacy; others will trade epistemic irrationality for greater practical unity, and 
thus ignore or partition evidence of indeterminacy in their own case.23 
 Velleman would be hard pressed to similarly deny the force of the objection. 
Reasons for action, on his account, are reasons to form the relevant belief about oneself. 
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The objection denies that one can be aware of the self-fulfilling nature of these beliefs 
and continue to have sufficient reason to justify forming any of them. The theory cannot 
present itself, then, as a theory of practical reason that may sometimes be at odds with 
what’s epistemically required. That answer requires that reasons for belief and reasons 
for action be distinct. 
 
4.2. Organization through attitudes other than belief 
 
This discussion of the previous subsection raises another question, though, of why we 
should insist that a determinate answer to the deliberative question “What do I want to 
do?” is settled in cases of prior indeterminacy through a belief. There are many theories 
allowing for the possibility of self-creation, reflective self-governance, or acts of defining 
commitment. They propose that these are achieved through long-term intentions 
(Bratman 2004), such intentions working in tandem with higher-order desires (Tiberius 
2000), or through an act of decisive identification (Frankfurt 1987). Connie Rosati (2003) 
takes it that what is in the agent’s personal good might itself be indeterminate, allowing 
for the possibility of the agent choosing to make it more determinate. Ruth Chang (2009) 
argues that incompleteness of reasons can be resolved through an act of will that creates 
new reasons for the agent in question. These theories all have implications about how we 
shape our motivational profiles, and if they do not directly address how this would allow 
us to answer the deliberative question ‘What do I want to do?’ they or a similar theory 
could plausibly be modified to do so.24 So why not allow one of these, unbelief-like 
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attitudes or acts to do the work of imposing determinacy, thereby sparing us worries 
about epistemic rationality? 
My argument at this point will be modest. One or several of these theories may be 
correct; they may describe actual capacities we possess. In typical cases, though, it could 
not be through the exercise of any of these capacities that actual agents determine what it 
is that they want. Despite their differences, all of these theories involve the idea that the 
relevant endorsement or commitment is volition-like, act-like, or decision-like; it is 
something the agent actively forms. This gets the experience of wanting wrong, at least in 
most cases. In general, we experience ourselves as passive with respect to desire. Desire 
is something that happens to us, something we discover, not something we choose. 
Romantic love is frequently felt this way, as is love for one’s children; and 
romantic comedies often use the trope of the protagonist realizing him- or herself to be in 
love through an epiphany. This is fiction, of course, but seems to correspond to 
something about how it is typically experienced; it isn’t something one consciously 
decides to commit to; one experiences oneself as falling in love.25 
One’s commitments to various projects are often experienced in the same way. 
We do sometimes choose our commitments, of course; but deliberating on what one 
wants is often resolved through what feels like a recognition rather than an act. 
The verdictive model shares with many of the theories above the sense that 
agents—especially through their reflective powers—play a role in shaping their motives 
and concerns; nonetheless, it is compatible with the standard experience of passivity. 
Because beliefs are not formed voluntarily, but are instead a result of the world 
impressing itself upon us, this capacity can be operative, even while we experience our 
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desires as things that largely happen to us. But though we might experience ourselves as 
passive with respect to our beliefs, they are still products of our rational activity, 
something we play a role in producing.26 
 
4.3. The epistemology of self-knowledge and desire 
 
Another objection to the verdictive account of desire offered here is that it is 
incompatible with a popular view about the nature of self-knowledge. According to these 
views, we know our own mind, not by attending to ourselves, trying to detect some 
psychological state, but by attending to the outside world. As Gareth Evans argued, one 
does not answer the question “Do you believe there will be a third world war?” by 
introspecting for a belief. Rather, one considers the evidence for and against the 
occurrence of a third world war (Evans 1982). In short, one looks out at how the world 
seems to be, and knows one’s belief on that basis. 
 This point has inspired a wide range of transparency accounts of self-knowledge 
(Moran 2001; Fernandez 2007; Byrne 2011, “Thinking,” and 2011, “Want”; and Valaris 
2014).27 These differ on the details, but all agree that questions about one’s own attitudes 
are transparent to questions about how the world is. This is directly contrary to my 
descriptions of how we typically answer the deliberative question “What do I want?” 
Here, I’ve treated the question as one about the agent’s own subjective state, rather than 
some state in the world. I’ve had the agent respond to evidence—constituted by her 
feelings and motivational history—to come to a judgment about what that subjective state 
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is. So the verdictive account of deliberation depends on a rejection of the transparency 
account of self-knowledge. 
 Fortunately, there are alternatives to the transparency account of self-knowledge, 
and there is reason to think that, whatever its merits as an account, say, of knowledge of 
one’s beliefs, it fares poorly as an account of knowledge of one’s desires. The problem 
with these accounts is simply the one put forward at the beginning of this paper: it is part 
of common sense that the state of the world underdetermines what it would make most 
sense for me to want—that is, even after specifying how the world is, or how I take the 
world to be, there is no set of desires that constitute the uniquely appropriate response to 
that specification (Way 2007). 
To make this clearer, we can ask to which question about the world my question 
“What do I want?” is supposedly transparent. The standard answer is that I know what it 
is I want by looking out on the world and determining what is worth wanting—what is 
good, desirable, what I should want (Moran 2001; Fernandez 2007; Byrne 2011 “Want;” 
and Valaris 2014). But this leads to two problems. First, there are many more things that I 
recognize as valuable that I nonetheless do not want: I do not wish to pursue every 
valuable career and some music I acknowledge as valuable is not to my tastes. A 
transparency account of self-knowledge fails to explain how I could know this about 
myself.28 Second, I often know myself to want one thing most, even in cases where I do 
not regard any of the possible ends as best. But again, the transparency accounts wrongly 
suggest that questions about what I want most are transparent to questions about what is 
most desirable. 
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Fortunately, Krista Lawlor’s (2007) account of knowing one’s own desires is 
more congenial to the verdictive account.29 Lawlor argues that knowledge of one’s own 
desires comes from various internal promptings: one feels various sensations in the case 
of simpler desires, or “imagined natural language sentences and images” in the case of 
more complex desires (49). Lawlor also argues that we sometimes self-ascribe a desire, 
but provisionally, and wait to see if the self-ascription feels accurate as time goes on (57). 
In some cases, we might find ourselves spontaneously resistant to the self-ascription 
(ibid.). On the basis of these kinds of internal promptings and feelings, we infer what 
kinds of desires we likely have, which desires would best explain these promptings. 
This account seems accurate as a story of how we come to know what it is we 
want, especially with large and complex decisions such as which career one wants to 
pursue, or whether one wants children. It is also compatible with the verdictive story 
offered here—the verdictive account simply adds that judgments about one’s desires will 
sometimes possess additional accuracy, because the facts will shift to accommodate the 
judgment. 
 
4.4. Is the theory still compatible with Humeanism about reasons? 
 
Before concluding, I will address one final potential misunderstanding: the worry that 
this theory could not serve as a contribution to Humean normative theory, because it 
explicitly requires that beliefs can change one’s intrinsic desires.30 Keep in mind that, 
even if this objection were correct, the verdictive model could still play one of the other, 
less ambitious theoretical roles discussed in section one (the theory is meant to be 
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compatible with Humeanism, not to assume it). But the worry is misguided. For certain 
theorists, the empirical claim that beliefs do not alter intrinsic motives is an important 
part of their Humeanism (Sinhababu 2009; and Arpaly and Schroeder 2012); however, 
this has hardly been a standard commitment for normative Humeans (who, after all, are 
offering a theory about reasons, not necessarily a theory of the etiology of desires). 
Bernard Williams, for example, argues that aspects of deliberation such as the exercise of 
imagination can generate new desires: 
 
In his unaided deliberative reason, or encouraged by the persuasions 
of others, [the agent] may come to have a concrete sense of what 
would be involved, and lose his desire for it, just as, positively, the 
imagination can create new possibilities and new desires. … 
 We should not, then, think of S [the agent’s motivational set] as 
statically given. The process of deliberation can have all sorts of 
effects on S, and this is a fact which a theory of internal reasons 
should be very happy to accommodate. 
(1981, 104-105) 
 
Similarly, Donald Hubin, in his (1999) elaboration of the commitments of Humeanism 
about practical reason, writes of the possibility of deliberation bringing into existence 
new desires for ends: 
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…I think that we are often [when deliberating] engaged not in 
practical reasoning but in a precondition for practical reasoning. And 
this precondition is not the discovery of a preexisting conative 
structure with which to define our evaluative point of view. We are 
not trying to discover our evaluative point of view; we are creating it. 
Just as we entertain a hypothesis to draw out its implications and 
(sometimes) to see the world as we would if we believed it, we at 
times "try on" normative stances. If I am right, this can be more than a 
process of gaining knowledge of our values; it is sometimes an act of 
self-creation. 
(41-42) 
 
The theory offered here is different in that it is not imagination—imagining possibilities 
or “trying on” evaluative perspectives—that alters one’s desires. Rather, it is a kind of 
belief. Nonetheless, what the view here shares with these pictures is a commitment that in 
deliberation about one’s final ends, there is no rationally mandatory or correct answer 
about which ends to have, independent of the answer the deliberating agent comes to. 
This, moreover, is the only commitment about the role of deliberation in producing 
motives that a normative Humean would have to accept (otherwise passion would in 
some cases be subject to reason). It is easily captured by a theory that models such 
conclusions off judicial interpretations of indeterminate law. Rather than a rejection of 
normative Humeanism, the verdictive model is simply one particular way for the Humean 
to make sense of the real phenomenon of deliberation about one’s final ends. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
It is worth noting again that the verdictive role of self-reflection seems to follow very 
naturally from standard platitudes about the belief-desire model. This is perhaps the 
account’s most notable theoretical virtue: its explanations come compliments of the 
theoretical house where many of us already reside. It posits no additional capacities, 
attitude-types, or aims. There may well be more theoretical commitment in trying to 
justify the decision to send it back, than in simply accepting the account.31 
Accepting this complementary theoretical machinery allows us a straightforward 
explanation of how we are able to resolve deliberation framed in terms of our wants, 
despite the fact that the most natural picture of how desires are ranked implies 
widespread imprecision in that ranking. It offers a promising account of weighting for a 
Humean theory of reasons, and additionally suggests for the Humean a more exact 
interpretation of what is going on when agents deliberate about their final ends. It 
provides a mechanism by which agents can determine their personal projects and other 
idiosyncratic concerns, but which also explain why we rarely experience ourselves as 
choosing what to care about. In the course of doing so it makes room for the possibility of 
self-fashioning experienced as passive. 
This last point—that self-reflection on this model is heavily tied to a form of self-
fashioning—suggests another point at which the legal analogy might be appropriate. The 
verdictive model may point to the possibility of kind of autonomy not dependent on acts 
of self-legislation, but instead evolving out of a case law or common law of the self.* 
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1 Mark Schroeder (2007) identifies this position as Proportionalism; but note that he offers an 
alternative Humean answer to the problem of weighting reasons, which he calls Hypotheticalism. 
2 Thanks to a referee for helping me make this point more clearly. 
3 Also see (Bratman 2012, especially p. 93). 
4 See (Sinhababu 2009) for a picture like this. There are many other theories of desire; however, 
the aim of this paper is simply to introduce a new theory and address some of the more obvious 
objections. Summary and critique of other views would make it unacceptably long. Readers 
should consider, however, views which seem to identify the rational force of a desire with its 
motivational force after cognitive enhancement (cf. Williams 1980); views which identify its 
rational force with its role as a quasi-perceptual state representing value (Oddie 2005; and Shafer 
2013); and Timothy Schroeder’s empirically informed account which identifies a desire’s rational 
force with the amount of reward its satisfaction would bring (see his 2004; 2010; and Arpaly and 
Schroeder 2012). For an alternate account of how reward and desire interact, see Richard 
Holton’s (2009, 101-111) discussion of empirical work on addiction, also summarized in 
(Berridge 2004). Finally, note that all of these other theories may in fact be consistent with the 
primary conclusion of this section—that often the relative rational import of a desire is 
indeterminate. But discussing this for each possible theory would be beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
5 See (Holton 2009, 101-111) for discussion of empirical studies showing that motivation and 
feelings can come apart; for an example of a recent study, see (Berridge 2009, especially §2.2). 
6 See (Sinhababu 2011) for discussion of similar cases and the argument that they actually 
increase the plausibility of Humean theories of reasons, by allowing Humeans space to discuss 
and explain irrationality; also see (Hubin 2001 and 2003; and Sobel 2011, 66-70). 
7 I have here assumed that the felt aspect of desires has to do primarily with their satisfaction or 
frustration. But a referee worries that there may be cases in which I would be happier if some 
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counterfactual were true, but I don’t desire the situation at all—perhaps because I never 
considered the possibility. If this is so, anticipatory phenomenology might be more significant. 
Feelings of excitement, fear, longing, and so on may play an especially important role in 
determining how much I want some end. This may be: but the reasons for thinking the 
phenomenological intensity of satisfactions is in many cases indeterminate are also reasons to 
think the same about the intensity of anticipations. 
8 Thanks to Nate Sharadin for help with making this point. 
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this point. 
10 My ideas here have been heavily influenced by the work and insights of (Taylor 1976; McGeer 
1996; Moran 2001; Helm 2002; Rosati 2003; Velleman 2000; 2006; and 2008; and Wood’s 1990 
discussion of the relation between freedom, happiness, and desire in Hegel, especially pp. 58-71). 
11 Thanks to Louise Anthony for calling this problem to my attention. 
12 The idea of understanding self-reflective beliefs via an analogy with speech acts is inspired by 
(McGeer 1996), in which such beliefs are compared with comissives. 
13 For a taxonomy of theories of the objectivity of the law and the role verdicts play in 
establishing the law, see (Coleman and Leiter 1993). Using their terminology, it is unclear to me 
if Hart is better read as holding legal facts to be minimally objective; or if he instead occupies an 
intermediate position between minimal and modest objectivity. Also see (Rosati 2004) for an 
overview of the problems of objectivity in the law. 
14 Borrowing ideas from legal positivism in order to better understand the structure of normativity 
in desire-based accounts of reason is also pursued in (Hubin 2001). 
15 Thanks to a referee for pushing me on this point. 
16 Some readers may be concerned that Smith’s picture of practical reasoning is anti-Humean 
(2004 “Internal Reasons”), and hence adopting his assumptions here is inconsistent with a 
Humean picture of practical reason. However, Smith’s anti-Humean conclusions depend crucially 
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on his commitment that ideally rational agents will converge in their intrinsic desires (ibid). If we 
abandon this commitment, we can accept his points about that agent’s desires will evolve 
according to their assessments of what would be most rational for them, without the anti-Humean 
consequences. 
17 Thanks to Tristram McPherson for raising this issue. 
18 On the other hand, my interpretation of my phenomenology may change it, or it may change 
the rational weight that different feelings contribute. This theory is compatible with either answer. 
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point. 
20 At least, this is clearly the earlier position. In the latter work (2008) it is unclear whether 
Velleman thinks that intentions are self-fulfilling prophecies. Nonetheless, he continues to hold 
that it is a drive to maintain the truth of one’s self-conception that allows these self-conceptions to 
be self-fulfilling. 
21 A referee questions whether Velleman’s theory and the verdictive account are even 
incompatible. I believe that they are: Velleman argues that facts about which attitudes it would 
make most (normative) sense to have is ultimately explained in terms of what attitudes would 
make most explanatory sense to the agent, given her self-conception (2008). Part of the 
assumption of the verdictive model is that facts about which attitude the agent’s psychology 
would best rationalize can come apart from what we would predict that the psychology is likely to 
cause, because systematic and predictable irrationality is possible. However, if I am wrong on this 
point, the following can be read as simply pointing out that certain objections to Velleman do not 
apply to the verdictive account. 
22 The relevant evidential scenario may also be rare. It requires that agents know about 
indeterminacy of strength of desires (an arcane philosophical thesis) and that they have 
compelling evidence of such indeterminacy among the desires at issue in a given case.  
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23 Does this introduce a significant rift between practical and theoretical rationality? It seems only 
to suggest that epistemically ideal agents will sometimes lack standard capacities for managing 
their practical attitudes. But this is an instance of a familiar fact. A mysophobe (“germaphobe,” 
colloquially) may, for example, employ self-deception about the ubiquity of microbes to prevent 
panic. Perfect epistemic rationality would likely hobble such an agent. 
24 Some care is required here. These theories do not address questions of what it is for one desire 
to be stronger than another. But some presumably could be revised to do so, while others should 
plausibly be understood as interpreting the question ‘What do I want to do?’ not as a question 
about what one wants most, but as a question about which motive makes up the “agent’s 
perspective” (as in Watson 1975), or has authority “to speak for the agent” (as in Bratman 2000). 
25 An exception to this general tendency to see self-creation in volitional terms are Frankfurt’s 
discussions of the nature of caring and love (1998, “Autonomy”; and 1998, “Caring”) as 
volitional necessities—concerns that the agent cannot help but have. Nomy Arpaly’s discussion of 
romantic incompatibilism (2006, Chapter 2) also addresses this feature of love, but in the service 
of undermining the normative significance of self-creation. 
26 While the theory here is ultimately significantly different from the ones they offer, (Taylor 
1976) and (Helm 2002) both offer compelling and insightful cases in which self-reflection could 
plausibly bring about something between self-discovery and self-invention. Helm especially 
offers interesting discussion of how this fact would leave us in some respects active and in other 
respects receptive. 
27 Also see (McGeer 1996) for an account of self-knowledge which does not explicitly endorse 
transparency, but has similarities with certain transparency accounts, especially with (Moran 
2001). 
28 But see (Byrne 2011, “Want;” and Ashwell 2013) for ways in which a transparency theorist 
might account for our ability to know when our desires and our assessments of value come apart. 
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Byrne’s story depends crucially on transparent knowledge of our own intentions. See (Baker 
2015) for criticisms of Byrne’s account of transparent knowledge of one’s own intentions. 
Ashwell’s story depends on knowledge of what appears valuable to us. 
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this paper to my attention. 
30 Thanks to an anonymous referee of an earlier version of this paper for raising this problem. 
31 A referee helpfully notes that desires for happiness, or a higher-order desire for desire 
satisfaction, or a desire for rational coherence, could also explain cases in which my beliefs about 
what I desire affect my choice, without those beliefs playing any sort of verdictive role. I have no 
disagreement here: the effects of our beliefs about desires on our choices could easily be 
overdetermined. To repeat, the case for the verdictive role of self-reflective judgments is the fact 
that judgments about what I want put rational pressure on me to adopt motives consistent with 
that judgment; this combined with a general disposition towards rational coherence will lead self-
reflective judgments to play a verdictive role. 
* Thanks to Lousie Anthony, Elizabeth Harman, Donald Hubin, Tristram McPherson, Alexander 
Nehamas, Philip Pettit, Nate Sharadin, Michael Smith, Jack Woods, and the audiences at 
Princeton University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, National University of Singapore, and 
the Conference on Rationality and Its Rivals at University of Macau for comments, criticisms, 
and questions. Research appearing in this article was substantially funded by a grant from the 
Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China (LU342612, ‘Autonomy as Self-
Interpretation). 
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